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CAKINKY EMPIRICISM
DANILYN RUTHERFORD
University of California, Santa Cruz
It is time for anthropology to reclaim the empirical. But this reclaiming must
be accompanied by a rethinking of what empiricism means. What I’d like to affirm
in this article—and have attempted to practice in my recent research—is a kind of
empiricism that builds on the singular power of anthropological ways of knowing
the world. A kinky empiricism: kinky, like a slinky, twisting back on itself, but
also kinky, like S and M and other queer elaborations of established scenarios,
relationships, and things. An empiricism that admits that one never gets to the
bottom of things, yet also accepts and even celebrates the disavowals required of
us given a world that forces us to act. An empiricism that is ethical because its
methods create obligations, obligations that compel those who seek knowledge to
put themselves on the line by making truth claims that they know will intervene
within the settings and among the people they describe.
There are several reasons why now is a good time for anthropologists to insist
on the empirical nature of what they do. The new kinds of interchanges in which
anthropologists are now engaged create obligations of a particularly pressing sort.
There is a price of admission to the politically fraught arenas that anthropologists
are increasingly entering. As I have learned in my work in the troubled Indonesian
territory of West Papua, paying this price can require us to write and speak
authoritatively on issues thatmatter to the peoplewe have studied. But all too often,
anthropology has appeared to outsiders as having a tangential relationship to the
empirical, producing knowledge that is too partial, too particular, too relativistic or
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:3
theoretical to bear on real world questions. However mistaken, such views reflect
the long shadow cast by the 1980s, a time when many anthropologists developed
new allegiances in the humanities. In reclaiming the empirical for anthropology,
we must contend with the legacy of this e´poque in the discipline’s development.
In writings demonized as steering anthropology away from “reality” that one finds
the clearest expression of the epistemology that is implicitly embraced by the
best practitioners of the discipline. These writings make the case for a kinky kind
of empiricism, an empiricism that takes seriously the situated nature of what all
thinkers do.
Sometimes to find the way forward, one must begin by looking back. In the
first half of this article, I consider two sources for the ingredients for the kinky
empiricism that I would like to affirm as a critical dimension of contemporary
anthropology.Thefirst isWritingCulture (Clifford andMarcus 1986),which, I argue,
helped add to the phenomena open to anthropological enquiry by foregrounding
the circumstances of ethnography. The second is the work of David Hume, whose
epistemology, I argue, proves surprisingly resonant with the empiricism implicitly
endorsed in Writing Culture. Following the lead of Gilles Deleuze, Brian Massumi,
and others who have read Hume in new ways, I consider how this 18th-century
philosopher, like Writing Culture’s contributors, sketched out an empiricism that
was both skeptical and ethical because it included among its objects of inquiry the
apparatuses through which reality is known.
My aim is not simply descriptive; it is also polemical. Kinky empiricism is
a position I would like anthropology to embrace. But it is also a position that
brings with it dangers as well as possibilities. In the final section of this article,
I turn to my research in Dutch New Guinea and the pitfalls of ways of knowing
that anthropologists and colonial officials have shared. I end by considering a
recent ethnography that responds to these dangers and possibilities in a particularly
compelling way. Kinky empiricism is always slightly off kilter, always aware of
the slipperiness of its grounds and of the difficulty of adequately responding to
the ethical demands spawned by its methods. Being off-kilter is a strength, not a
weakness. For anthropology, it is what comes with getting real.
BACKWARD LOOK ONE
In the 1980s, the potted history of our discipline goes, anthropology turned
left while its sister disciplines turned right. Significant subgroups within psychol-
ogy, political science, economics, and sociology began adopting mathematical
models and quantitative methods, and crafted experiments aimed at producing
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KINKY EMPIRICISM
generalizable findings. Anthropology, for its part, looked inward, producing self-
indulgent, jargon strewn texts that only the initiated could understand. Silliness
ruled the day. “I’ve talked enough about me,” the “postmodern” anthropologist in
the famous joke says to an informant. “What do you think about me?” “What’s the
difference between a gangster and a postmodernist?” another joke goes. “A post-
modernist gives you an offer you can’t understand.” For purveyors of this potted
history, the move toward dialogue and partial truths represented a retreat from
empirical research—above all from the kind of empirical research on colonized and
formerly colonized peoples and cultures for which the discipline long was known.
And when anthropology did finally come to its senses, the potted history goes on,
it turned its attention to colonialism and science: the peoples and cultures that gave
birth to anthropology. The fervor of the 1980s left anthropology unauthorized to
claim to know others; the best we could do was know ourselves.
I do not believe in this potted history, even though it was foisted on me at
a tender disciplinary age. (The second person to introduce me to anthropology
was Steve Sangren, a Marxist anthropologist of the Terry Turner persuasion who
wrote a critique of Writing Culture and other “postmodern” works that appeared in
Current Anthropology shortly before I arrived at Cornell [1988]. The first person to
introduce me to anthropology was Jim Siegel, a student of Clifford Geertz who
was so idiosyncratic in his orientation to the discipline that the first course I took,
“Political Anthropology,” had a syllabus that consisted exclusively of serialized
novels in colonial Malay.)1 This potted history makes me squirm whenever I
confront it, which is usually in conversations with other social scientists. It’s way
too easy to get sucked into the narrative. “But we’ve left those bad old days behind!”
I find myself saying. “We’re doing all kinds of hard-nosed work!” When we open
Writing Culture and actually read it, a different view of the “bad old days” comes
into focus. Writing Culture provides a warrant for an anthropological empiricism
that takes on more reality, not less.
The reality taken on by Writing Culture takes two forms. On the one hand, the
chapters in the collection extend the range of empirical phenomena open to inquiry
outward and criticize those who have limited their studies’ scope. Renato Rosaldo
(1986) discusses the pacification campaigns undertaken in the Sudan shortly before
Evans-Pritchard contracted “Nueritis” trying to extract information about local
politics from his understandably reticent Nuer informants. Vincent Crapanzano
(1986) criticizes Clifford Geertz’s famous essay on the Balinese cockfight for failing
to provide enough empirical evidence to substantiate Geertz’s claims. “Wemust go
further” is a refrain repeated throughout Writing Culture—we must say more about
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:3
the intellectual settings and professional imperatives that are shaping our discipline,
Paul Rabinow (1986) tells us (see also Marcus 1986b); we must say more about
the interplay of social phenomena on different levels and scales, George Marcus
(1986a) insists. This dimension ofWriting Culture reflects what I see as a key strength
of the discipline. Because we don’t set the parameters of admissible data from the
get-go, anthropologists are arguably able to be more empirical than social scientists
constrained by survey instruments and the need for large samples. We sacrifice
what statisticians call statistical validity, but we gain construct validity: a higher
level of confidence thatwe are doing justice to amessy reality.Writing Culture queers
this second kind of validity. The chapters reveal a kinky penchant for thoroughly
specifying the messy reality with which anthropologists are concerned.
On the other hand, the chapters inWriting Culture also, more famously, extend
the range of empirical phenomena open to inquiry inward toward the research and
writing process itself (see Clifford 1986a, 1986b; Fischer 1986; Tyler 1986).
Taking the quest for construct validity to an extreme, Writing Culture’s empiricism
becomes kinky in a second sense: this empiricism loops back on itself. In bringing
ethnography’s dialogic character clearly into view, the collection raises ethical
questions about the enterprise, questions to which some contributors responded
by calling for writing practices that more fully represented informants’ voices in
a work. In the years since Writing Culture was published, linguistic anthropologists
have provided us with a sophisticated understanding of the issues raised by the
book’s kinky obsession with reflexivity (see Lucy 1993; Silverstein 1976). As
Writing Culture’s authors knew well, dialogue never happens between just two
sides (see Bakhtin 1981; see also Feldman 1991; Keane 1997.2 Bearing the traces
of long histories of interaction, dialogue also never happens in just one setting
but, rather, requires the bringing into relevance of institutions that authorize,
valorize, and lend prestige to speakers’ words (see Silverstein 2004; see also Agha
2007). Dialogue is always fraught with ethical conundrums. To converse is to
engage in an exchange of gestures. To exchange is to receive and to receive is to
confront the impossible demand to give others their due. For anthropologists, the
conundrums multiply. Fieldwork generates both debts and identities in the back
and forth through which interlocutors create a sense of what they are up to and
who they are. Anthropologists find themselves compelled to do right by a cultural
other that fades into a specter as soon as they think hard about what they do.3 This
second dimension of kinky empiricism—its slinky effect, as we might call it—eats
away at certainty as well as good conscience. When anthropologists look closely at
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KINKY EMPIRICISM
their own research practices, it becomes clear that partial truths are the best they
can do.
What I see as themost important contribution ofWriting Culture is this coupling
of the empirical and the ethical. What I have described as two realities are really
just aspects of one: the messy reality in which ethnography lives. Unfortunately,
readers of the collection haven’t always recognized that, forWriting Culture, looking
outward and looking inward are two sides of the same kinky coin.4 To some degree,
Writing Culture’s authors and contributors were complicit in perpetrating this view,
adding references to empirical “standards” almost as an afterthought. In fact, there
is nothing inconsistent or incoherent about the implicit epistemology articulated
in Writing Culture. The reflexive turn in anthropology has expanded, rather than
contracted, the discipline’s power to represent reality. The ethical challenges that
have come out of this recognition are indicative of how much more, rather than
less, anthropology is trying to say about the empirical world. I think we can do a
better job of defining and defending this dimension of our discipline. But this may
require yet another look backward—to an early champion of empiricism, a thinker
whom at least one contributor toWriting Culturemay have too hastily dismissed.
BACKWARD LOOK TWO
Eighteenth-century philosopher, friend of Adam Smith, “a man of letters and,
in a mild manner, a man of affairs,” as one biographer puts it, David Hume would
seem an odd patron saint for today’s anthropologists (see Macnabb 1962:28). Born
in 1711, Hume entered Edinburgh University at the age of ten and encountered
the writings of John Locke as a teenager before decamping for France. There, in
his early twenties, he wrote his magnificent flop, A Treatise of Human Nature and
made friends with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whom he “imported to England” and
provided with a house, a dog, a mistress, and a pension from the King. (“But
nothing would persuade Rousseau that Hume was not secretly plotting his ridicule
and humiliation,” D. C. G. Macnabb [1962:28–29] reports). “The relationship
ended in a spectacular quarrel. In self-justification, Hume was forced to publish
the correspondence, from which it is abundantly clear that the only man who ever
hated Hume was mad.”) Hume himself never married, preferring to live with his
sister and a cat. Whatever Hume’s erotic proclivities—he seems less kinky than
quirky by this account—his thinking clearly had twists.5 Giving with one hand
and taking with the other, leading the careful reader on a conceptual loop, Hume
proclaimed that all knowledge begins in experience. But he also argued that we
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:3
have no real reason to trust experience or to believe that what has happened in the
past provides a basis for predicting what is to come.
Hume was, among other things, an epistemologist, and hence a proponent of
a breed of thinking dismissed in Paul Rabinow’s chapter in Writing Culture as “an
accidental, but eventually sterile, turning inWestern culture” (Rabinow1986:234).
But as Gilles Deleuze (1991) and Brian Massumi (2002), have suggested, Hume’s
work may be more generative than Rabinow would lead us to think. I find it useful
to read Hume’s work as fodder for an exercise in reverse engineering. If we begin
with the view of thought advocated by Rabinow (1986:234) in his chapter—as
“nothing more or less than a historically locatable set of practices”—what kind of
mechanism do we need to envision such that thought and the subjectivity of the
thinker could both be, in Deleuze’s words, “constituted in the given” (1991:104)?
Whether or not we call it epistemology, a tacit understanding of how this might
work weaves its way through our research in the wake of Writing Culture. Hume is
perhaps less useful in telling us what we should think than shedding light on what
we do think when we are making the most of our methods: the kinky empiricist
background assumptions that structure knowledge production in our field.
Two of Hume’s terms provide useful tools for grasping these background
assumptions. The first is the notion of circumstances, which relates to the first
form of reality addressed by Writing Culture: the one that comes into focus when
one takes in the broader contexts that shape what anthropologists find in the field.
Hume is famous for his account of what he calls “moral reasoning,” a category that
encompasses the lion’s share of thought, which, with the sole exception of certain
problems in mathematics, proceeds through inference (see Hume 1962, 1988; see
also Deleuze 1991). Inference, for Hume, is an interpretive practice that reads the
unfolding of events as signs of what once was and what is to come. Inference, like
all sign use, cannot occur in a vacuum. Interpretation is an imaginative form of
conduct in which what Hume calls the “fancy” moves along grooves established by
previous encounters with the world. In describing the aggregated effect of these
encounters, Hume draws on the notion of circumstances. Circumstances consist of
the patterned distribution of happenings that makes it more or less probable that a
certain person will have certain experiences. Circumstances shape the expectations
that lead particular people to read a particular cause or effect off of a particular
event.
ButHume goes further than the contributors toWriting Culture did in exploring
how circumstances influencewhat people think and do. The solid ground ofHume’s
empiricism grows shaky when he considers the process through which experiences
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KINKY EMPIRICISM
give rise to expectations. Hume asserts that the ability to infer is adaptive: it is the
basis not only for science and technology but also for government, civil society,
and domestic life. Yet he also does much to show that the practice of inference has
no logical rationale. The mind-fuck moment in Hume’s writings comes when he
argues that the legitimacy of our inferences stands or falls on the assumption that
events will have the same kind of causes and consequences in the future as they did
in the past (see Hume 1988). There is no way of adducing evidence in support of
this assumption because it is the assumption on which the very notion of evidence
rests. (Pause. Think about it!) If we believe in the evidence of our senses, it is
because of what Hume calls a “principle of human nature,” “custom,” which Hume
describes as a quasi-organic variety of the repetition compulsion that drives us to
wait for a “tock” following every “tick” (see Hume 1962; see also Deleuze 1991,
1994). Unlike philosophers who draw a distinction betweenmind and body, Hume
finds passion at the heart of reason. Rational thought draws on the same organic
forces that drive hunger, lust, and the beating of hearts. Along with fellow feeling,
reason is less sublime than lizard brained.
The same tendency both to trust experience and undermine it runs through
Writing Culture’s critique of the anthropology of its day. Something like Hume’s
notion of circumstances makes an appearance throughout the book. The contribu-
tors’ point is not that anything goes, when it comes to interpreting ethnographic
data. Their point is that what does go is, to quote Paul Rabinow again, “historically
locatable.” Interpretations follow grooves laid in the imaginations of individuals and
institutions by virtue of their pathways through space and time. Notably, interpre-
tations follow grooves left by what Hume (1962) calls “artifices”: technologies for
regulating the imagination, which for Hume include both police forces and books.
What Hume adds to this approach is the proposal that among the circumstances
that matter is the form of the organism that thinks. The process of interpretation is
anything but dispassionate. Thinking occurs in the body, not some isolated “internal
space,” and in the company of others linked together through the repetitions that
constitute custom. And the process of interpretation is scarcely immune to doubt.
Simply “being there” in the field cannot qualify an ethnographer to produce a trans-
parent account of what he or she has witnessed. Every observation is haunted by a
multiplicity of places and times. This holds for ethnographers and the ethnographers
of the ethnographers, not to mention the people they study. There is no act of
reasoning that is not a leap of faith, both embodied and collective. “Contextualize!”
we contemporary anthropologists tell our students. “But take nothing for granted,
including context,” we always add.
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:3
The second term from Hume’s repertoire that provides us with a grip on
the implicit epistemology we have inherited from Writing Culture is sympathy (see
Hume 1962, Deleuze 1991; see also Panagia 2006). Sympathy for Hume is not
empathy, pity, or any of the other rosy synonyms for the ability to identify with
another thatwe tend to associatewith theword. Rather, it is the embodied outcome
of proximity—occasioned by the placement of human bodies and artifacts in space
and time—that leads people to share perspectives and passions. Sympathy is the
outcome of inference, but with a twist. One witnesses an event—a gesture, a facial
expression, an utterance—and one infers a cause, in this case the passion that led
to this effect. Proximity makes the passion vivid, and one comes to feel what one
imagines the other feels. The ability to share perspectives and passions, for Hume, is
not simply the basis of friendship, kinship, and romance. Like inference, sympathy
plays a critical role in public life. Without this passion, there would be no state, no
economy, and no science. Sympathy is an embodied mode of intersubjectivity; it
is the sentiment that provides the grounds of all social pursuits. Sympathy is both
a source of power and compassion. It is an instrument of governance. It is also the
privileged instrument of ethnography. “Be interested in what people are interested
in,” we tell our students. We often add a caveat: “Don’t presume that simply by
seeing things their way you are necessarily doing them any good.”
The empirical and the ethical go hand in hand in Hume’s work, as they do in
Writing Culture and the best of contemporary anthropology. Inference and sympathy
are key ingredients in every human project. They are ways of getting things done.
As kinky empiricists, we would do well to follow Hume in insisting that it is not
just anthropologists who engage in “moral reasoning,” as singular as our research
methods might seem. So do sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political
scientists, along with our more distant cousins in the natural and physical sciences.
What is distinctive about anthropology among the disciplines—what makes our
form of moral reasoning particularly fruitful—is the fact that we refuse to draw
a categorical distinction between our practices and those of the people we study.
This kind of reflexivity would risk becoming paralyzing, if it were not for an
insight that Hume also offers. Even though we are aware of the partiality of our
truths, we still must act. For Hume, our seemingly most rigorous ways of thinking
proceeds “merely from an illusion of the imagination” (Panagia 2006:90). And yet
the practical effects of “this capacity to compose fictions to both ourselves and
others,” as the Canadian philosopher Davide Panagia points out, are what “saves us
from the kind of nihilism Hume’s radical skepticism might induce” (2006:90). As
Jacques Derrida (1995, 1996) insisted, an ethical question is one that cannot be
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KINKY EMPIRICISM
answered according to a prescription or program. Uncertainty and justice go hand
in hand in those moments that force us to choose among contending ways of doing
the right thing. The empiricism that characterizes anthropology at its best is both
skeptical and committed. The discipline’s future lives in the kinks.
LOOKING FORWARD
If anthropology is going to remain a going concern, we have to learn to inhabit
the ethical quandaries built into our kinky empiricism more creatively by building
alliances across some of the barriers we have built around cultural anthropology. I
have in mind those that divide us from policy work and the more quantitative social
sciences. Counting people is not the only way to control them. When it comes
to the consequences of our research, the best lives next door to the worst, as my
work on sympathy and colonial state-building makes clear (see Rutherford 2009).
In my investigation of the establishment of the first government post in the New
Guinea highlands, I came upon an episode that stopped me in my tracks. It was in
Lloyd Rhys’s Jungle Pimpernel (1947), which describes the life and times of one
of the officers whose expedition reports I poured over as part of the research for a
book I am finishing. Jan Victor de Bruyn was the mixed race son of a planter, an
urbane, sophisticated man with a doctorate in Javanese archeology who responded
to the call of New Guinea. De Bruyn made it his mission to bring the “Stone Age”
Papuans into the modern world through a carefully crafted program of colonial
intervention. He was so devoted to this task that he refused to evacuate when
western New Guinea fell to the Japanese at the outset of World War II. Rhys
describes the wealth of ethnographic knowledge gathered by de Bruyn during his
adventures running from the Japanese. De Bruyn gained an intimate acquaintance
with the Papuans’ distinct form of justice when a man accused of sleeping with
another man’s wife took shelter in the house where de Bruyn was staying. The man
begged de Bruyn to save him, and de Bruyn almost succeeded, moved as he was
by the dread that swept over the unfortunate man. But when the crowd set fire to
the building, forcing the culprit to come out, de Bruyn picked up his camera. Rhys
recounts what happened next. “When the adulterer had been shot and captured
and de Bruyn could do nothing to intervene, he took the opportunity of taking an
extraordinary set of photographs of the scene. Like many of his pictures they are
unique. No other white man is known to have witnessed such an event, and no
other photographs are known to exist” (Rhys 1947:210).
For de Bruyn, as for other Dutch officials in New Guinea, sympathy was a
means of controlling the Papuans. And yet it created obligations—obligations born
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:3
of the unsettling proximity that de Bruyn had to experience to get state-building
done. The fact that sympathy was an instrumental, as well as an unavoidable,
element of governance in New Guinea may have made it easier for de Bruyn to put
sympathy back in his toolbox when its demands proved impossible to fulfill. This is
not to say that the obligations born of de Bruyn’s proximity to the Papuans were not
real. The abruptness with which de Bruyn turned to photography is evidence of the
violence it took to turn away when he was faced with the prospect of sympathizing
with the dead. However much we might want to distance ourselves from colonial
figures like de Bruyn, the scenario Rhys describes should make anthropologists
uncomfortable. This is not simply because there is no way fully to satisfy our
obligation to others. It is also because an ethnographer and his or her subjects come
from and return to different places. He or she and they come from and return
to different sets of circumstances that open different opportunities, offer different
constraints, and pose different demands.
When Jeff Schonberg picked up his camera in the research that led to Righteous
Dopefiend (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009), his and Philippe Bourgois’s astonishing
study of homeless heroin users in San Francisco, it was not in an effort to turn his
back on obligations. Like de Bruyn, Schonberg documented suffering: the dusty,
trash-strewn roadside where a man crouches to inject himself, the exposed flesh
left after the removal of an abscess from another man’s neck; the grief on the face
of another man near the coffin of a deceased friend. But Schonberg’s aim was not to
take a distanced view on the distress he witnessed; it was to help create a book that
acts as an artifact, in Hume’s sense, enlivening the passions—and expanding the
imaginations—of anyone who opens its pages. The two authors’ prose fulfills much
the same function. The book consists of a refreshingly unapologetic combination of
divergent kinds of evidence—from statistical data drawn from the public health and
policy studies literatures to excerpts from field notes intimately detailing particular
people’s lives, loves, and torments.
What is remarkable about the book is its ability to track between the empirical
and the ethical. The book offers a fascinating analysis of the different ways black and
white heroin addicts inhabit their predicament: from their methods of injection,
to their ways of getting by, to the divergent ways they stand, talk, move and react
in a world that is ethnically divided. At the same time, Bourgois and Schonberg
get close enough to the complicated lives of individuals to show how ethnic
boundaries are crossed. Large-scale circumstances are everywhere revealed in this
ethnography as shaping the narrow world that Bourgois and Schonberg describe.
These circumstances range from the role of race in fragmenting the labor force that
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existed before economic change turned this industrialized neighborhood of the city
into a wasteland, to the tendency of African American extended families to retain
ties to addicted relatives, to the streetwise styles of comportment available to black
addicts, but not to whites, who appear to the world as pitiful, not fearsome and
strong. And yet Bourgois and Schonberg’s role in the narrow world created by
these circumstances is anything but that of a tourist. Bourgois and Schonberg hung
out with the heroin addicts. They went with them on “licks”—expeditions to steal
enough resalable goods to provide for another fix. They slept in their leaky tents
on cold, rainy winter nights. They lent money to the addicts; they gave them rides;
they gave them photographs; they documented the stories and images the addicts
wanted them to record.
The book stands as a tribute to particular people: Tina, Carter, Frank, Max,
Petey, Scotty. And yet it opens and closes as a policy study: a book that yields
specific recommendations on howAmericansmight dealwith the problemof heroin
addiction more effectively. The research Bourgois and Schonberg undertook was
funded to do precisely this: to document the public health implications of different
methods of injection. As much as Bourgois and Schonberg registered the effects of
specifically U.S.modes of sovereignty and governmentality in the lives of those they
studied, this lens does not obscure their gaze. The book ends with a bittersweet
account of how the authors tried to help the individuals who populate the book
escape drug addiction when their 12 years of fieldwork ended. But it also ends
with a call to action to transform the circumstances that made the lives described
in the book the ones the addicts had to lead. The efficacy of this appeal turns on a
methodological eclecticism in which fieldwork is not the only way to illuminate a
social world. It is impossible not to identifywith the people Bourgois and Schonberg
so generously and unflinchingly describe in their joy as well as their pain. But the
book’s efficacy depends on the authors’ ability to step back: to pick up not just a
camera, but also statistics. There is no question: the bold contentiousness called for
inWriting Culture is absent in Bourgois and Schonberg’s study. Righteous Dopefiend’s
kinky empiricism is marked by what one might hope is a different kind of bravery:
the courage to build alliances with anthropology’s disciplinary rivals in the social
sciences but to do so on our own terms.
In thinking through what these terms should be, I can’t help but miss the
voice of Rolph Trouillot, who would have been a wonderful participant in this
conversation. Twenty years ago, Trouillot told us that the time was ripe for
anthropologists to contest what he called the “savage slot”—the field of inquiry
that defined anthropology’s place among the disciplines well before anthropology
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even existed.6 Trouillot had a far less sanguine view of the project undertaken
in Writing Culture than I have presented here. Anthropological calls for reflexivity
were “timid, spontaneous—and in this sense genuinely American—responses to
major changes in relations between anthropology and the wider world, provincial
expressions of wider concerns, allusions to opportunities yet to be seized” now
that the “savages” were gone (Trouillot 1991:19). Today’s anthropologists have in
manyways seized these opportunities and undertaken the “fundamental redirection”
Trouillot demanded. There has been no shortage of anthropologists seeking “new
points of reentry by questioning the symbolic world upon which ‘nativeness’ is
presumed” (Trouillot 1991:40). This is no shortage of anthropologists “claiming
new grounds” (Trouillot 1991:36).7 But even as we engage in research that is
creating new contact zones among the social sciences, we still have yet to develop
compelling ways of describing what anthropologists can—and can’t—do better
than economists, psychologists, or political scientists. The time is still ripe for what
Trouillot called for: “an epistemology and semiology of all anthropology has done
and can do.”
Kinky empiricism: those who embrace it are attuned to the real world effects
of their own practices and the texts that they put into the world. They are aware
of the analytic and ethical twists and turns born of a research method that forces
them to get close enough to imagine how it might feel to walk in another’s shoes.
They are not afraid of dangerous liaisons. Writing Culture was not a detour on the
way to the projects undertaken by today’s anthropologists. In all its kinkiness, this
book pointed the way.
ABSTRACT
In this article, which takes James Clifford and George Marcus’s Writing Culture as its
starting point, I make the case for a kinky kind of empiricism that builds on the singular
power of anthropological ways of knowing the world. Kinky empiricism takes established
forms to an extreme and turns back to reflect on its own conditions of possibility. At
the same time, it deploys methods that create obligations, obligations that compel those
who seek knowledge to put themselves on the line by making truth claims that they
know will intervene within the settings and among the people they describe. I begin to
make this argument by way of a close rereading of moments in Writing Culture. I then
turn to David Hume’s writings on empiricism, which, I suggest, offer the ingredients
for an empiricism that is both skeptical and ethical because it includes among its
objects of inquiry the apparatuses through which reality is known. I end by exploring
dangers and possibilities associated with kinky empiricism by juxtaposing a moment
from my research on state building in Dutch New Guinea with the approach taken in
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Philippe Bourgois and Jeffrey Schonberg’s groundbreaking study, Righteous Dopefiend.
In rereading Writing Culture, I find the ingredients of a more affirmative stance toward
anthropology than is usually associated with Writing Culture—one premised on the
need for what Michel-Rolph Trouillot once called “an epistemology and semiology of
all anthropologists have done and can do.” [empiricism, anthropology, methods,
ethics, Dutch New Guinea United States]
NOTES
1. Siegel developed themes from this course in his brilliant study of Indonesian nationalism, Fetish,
Recognition, Revolution (1997).
2. Clifford and others of the time drew on Bakhtin (1981) for their notion of dialogue. Read by way
of Jakobson, Peirce, Goffman, Derrida, and others, Bahktin’s ideas about dialogue and voicing
also run through much of the work cited above.
3. See Siegel 1997 on this predicament.
4. See, for example, Sangren 1988. Clifford 1986a also points to the diversity of the chapters and
eschews any effort to reduce them to a single project.
5. In his introduction toDialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Richard H. Popkin reports that Hume
told Adam Smith that “the only reason he wanted to stay alive was to ‘see the elimination of
this strange superstition, Christianity, that pervaded the world.’ Then, in his usual skeptical
manner, Hume added that even if he could carry on his efforts in this direction, he doubted that
Christianity would ever be eliminated.” See Hume 1980.
6. Trouillot traced this slot to a the´matique born during the Renaissance, when the savage became
an element in the trilogy, along with order and utopia, that oriented the political and conceptual
moves through what we now take as the West came into being (1991:18). Whether or not
representations of the newly discovered “other” had any empirical reality is beside the point,
Trouillot tells us: “The savage is only evidence in a debate, the importance of which surpasses
not only his understanding but also his very existence” (1991:33).
7. To make a case for the advantages of the kind of knowledge anthropology produces is anything
but to invoke what Trouillot refers to as the “ahistorical voice of reason, justice, or civilization”
(1991:19). It is to acknowledge anthropology’s own situated standing as a science among other
sciences—to specifywhatwe can do—and can’t do—better than economists, political scientists,
or psychologists. We have to learn to think about anthropology within a wider landscape of
knowledge production and political action. Patting ourselves on the back from our studies of the
state, say, is misguided if we fail to contend with changes in the discipline of political science.
The other way of reading our ability to claim new ground is in terms of political science’s retreat
from the historical specificity associated with comparative politics. The motto would seem to
be “let the girls do it”—that is, leave this kind of empirical work to the relatively feminized
discipline of anthropology. The boys with their elegant rational choice models remain nestled
in the armpits of power. To become something other than specialists in savagery, we need to
find new ways to authorize our findings as something other than the musings of adventurers
seeking the exotic close to home. Trouillot calls on anthropology to intervene more effectively
in debates over the Western canon by championing minority voices. This challenge remains,
but these days there are also other interdisciplinary fish to fry.
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